Governance, product market competition and cash management in IPO firms
Abstract
This study evaluates the link between CEO governance heterogeneity, power structure of the firm, and product market competition on various facets of post-IPO cash policy. Our results suggest that post-IPO cash holdings as well as marginal value of cash reserves are higher under a founder CEO governance regime relative to non-founder CEOs. Concentrating board power in the hands of founder CEOs however, reduces their ability to maintain higher post-IPO cash reserves. Our results also suggest that product market competition influences both the level and marginal value of cash reserves in the hands of founder CEOs. Further, we find that stronger internal governance reduces the tendency of IPO firms to deploy excess cash reserves to fund internal investments in excess of industry rivals. Finally, our results suggest that excess cash reserves in competitive industry environments lead to superior post-IPO operating performance.
Keywords
Cash management; Product market competition; IPOs; Governance; Power structure
Article outline
Abstract
Highlights
JEL classification
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Data description and methodology
2.1. Sample description
2.2. Measurement of governance variables
2.3. Measures of product market competition
2.4. Empirical methodology
2.4.1. Methodology for estimating determinants of post IPO cash reserves
2.4.2. Estimation of the determinants of the marginal value of post-IPO cash reserves
3. Empirical results
3.1. Univariate results
3.2. Determinants of post-IPO cash reserves
3.3. Governance mechanisms and the marginal value of post-IPO cash reserves
3.4. Excess cash reserves and post-IPO investment decisions
3.5. Excess cash reserves, governance and post-IPO performance
3.6. Robustness tests
4. Conclusions
References
دانلود:
دانلود مقاله لاتین حاکمیت شرکتی، رقابت در بازار محصول و مدیریت نقدینگی در عرضه اولیه عمومی
امتیاز مورد نیاز
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دوشنبه, 10 آبان 1395 16:23
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